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Abstract 
 
In this paper we seek to add to current debates about surveillance and society by 
critically exploring the social implications of a new and emerging raft of surveillance 
practices: those which specifically surround digital techniques and technologies.  The 
paper has four parts. In the first, we outline the nature of digital surveillance, and 
consider how digital surveillance differs from other forms of surveillance. The second 
part of the paper explores the interconnections between digital techniques and the 
changing political economies of cities and urban societies. Here we explore the 
essential ambivalence of digital surveillance within the context of wider trends 
towards privatisation, liberalisation and social polarisation. The papers third part 
provide some insights into particular aspects of digital surveillance through three 
examples; algorithmic video surveillance (in which closed-circuit television systems 
are linked to software for the recognition of movement or identity); the increasingly 
prevalent practices of digital prioritisation in transport and communications; and the 
medical surveillance of populations, wherein databases are created for increasingly 
mixed state and commercial medical purposes.  Following this, in part four, we reflect 
on the policy and research implications raised by the spread of digital surveillance. 
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Introduction 
 
Wherever there has been the creation and enforcement of categories there has been 
surveillance. Historically, this was reinforced through religious and cultural norms. 
With capitalism and the modern state such practices were systematised through 
rational organisation: bureaucracy, management and policing. Now a further shift is 
taking place away from these direct supervisory techniques famously analysed by 
Foucault (1975). Advances in the technologies of sensing and recording have enabled 
a massive growth in the monitoring of individuals and groups, without the need for 
constant direct observation or containment of the monitored within particular spaces 
(Poster 1990; Deleuze, 1992; Gandy, 1993; Lyon, 1994, 2001; Lianos, 2001). For 
Gary Marx, this ‘new surveillance’ (Marx, 1988) is characterised by “the use of 
technical means to extract or create personal data… taken from individuals or 
contexts” (Marx, 2002: 12).  
 
Our aim in this paper is to critically explore the social implications of the digital 
within the ‘new surveillance’. Bureaucratic and electromechanical surveillance 
systems – a foundation for the modern nation-state, public health and welfare – are 
being supplemented and, increasingly replaced, by digital technologies and 
techniques, enabling what Jones has called ‘digital rule’ (Jones, 2000). Digitisation is 
significant for two reasons. Firstly, because it enables monitoring, prioritisation, and 
judgement to occur across widening geographical distances, and with little time delay 
(Lyon, 1994). Second, it allows the active sorting, identification, prioritisation, and 
tracking, of bodies, behaviours, and characteristics of subject populations, on a 
continuous, real time basis. Thus, digitisation encourages a tendency towards 
automation. Crucially, the work of human operators shifts from direct mediation and 
discretion, to the design, programming, supervision and maintenance of automated or 
semi-automatic surveillance systems (Lianos and Douglas, 2000). 
 
Digitisation facilitates a step change in the power, intensity, and scope of surveillance. 
Surveillance is everywhere. Computers are everywhere. Their combination already 
has that air of inevitability that can attach itself to the history of technology. 
Computer technology certainly is, as Henman (1997) argued, a player in social policy 
processes, but it is crucial not to read off social and policy implications and effects of 
digital surveillance deterministically from the intrinsic capabilities of the technologies 
involved. As McCahill (2002) and Thrift and French (2002) have demonstrated, such 
techniques are mediated, at all levels, by social practices, which interact with all 
aspects of the making and functioning of the technological system. Even apparently 
  
  
automated systems, far from being inhuman domains, involve continuous complex 
social practices and decisions which do much to shape digital surveillance in practice.  
 
This is important because a characteristic of digital surveillance technologies is their 
extreme flexibility and ambivalence. On one hand, systems can be designed to 
socially exclude, based on automated judgements of social or economic worth. On the 
other, the same systems can be programmed to help overcome social barriers and 
processes of marginalisation.  The broad social effects, and policy implications, of 
digital surveillance are thus contingent and, whilst flexible, are likely to be strongly 
biased by the political economic and social conditions which shape the principles 
embedded in their design and implementation.  
 
Currently, these conditions are marked by the widespread liberalisation and 
privatisation of public services and spaces. This reflects a movement from free, 
universal public services and spaces, based on citizenship, to markets and quasi-
markets based on consumerism. These markets continuously differentiate users based 
on ability to pay, risk, or eligibility of access. Whilst there is clearly much variation, 
and detail, in particular cases, this broad political economic bias means that digital 
surveillance is likely to be geared overwhelmingly towards supporting the processes 
of individualisation, commodification and consumerisation that are necessary to 
support broader political economic shifts towards markets, quasi-markets, and 
prioritised public services and spaces (see Graham and Marvin, 2001). 
 
The paper seeks to explore the nature, scope and implications of the growth of digital 
surveillance techniques and technologies. It has four parts. In the first, we outline the 
nature of digital surveillance and consider how digital surveillance differs from earlier 
forms. We argue that, whilst the changes may be considered merely quantitative (size, 
coverage, speed etc.), important new forms of social practice are facilitated by these 
changes.  The second part develops an exploratory analysis of the interconnections 
between digitization and the changing political economies of cities and urban 
societies. Here we examine the essential ambivalence of digital surveillance within 
the context of wider trends towards privatisation, liberalisation and social 
polarisation. We argue that the techniques may facilitate better services for mobile 
affluent citizens, but that this is often paralleled by a relative worsening of the 
position of more marginalised groups who are physically or electronically excluded or 
bypassed by automated surveillance. The third part illustrates these points through 
three examples; algorithmic video surveillance; digital prioritisation in transport and 
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communications; and, electronic patient records and genetic research.  Finally, in part 
four, we reflect on the policy challenges raised by the spread of digital surveillance. 
 
 
 
Digital Surveillance: Making a Difference? 
 
Digital encoding works by reducing information to the minimum necessary for 
accurate reconstruction: the binary code of 1s and 0s. In contrast, analogue forms aim 
at perfect reproduction of the original. Digital surveillance thus makes the information 
more amenable to storage, transmission and computation. But is it sufficiently 
different from analogue forms to merit rethinking and retheorisation?  
 
Michel Foucault’s (1975) concept of ‘panopticism’1, the tendency towards a 
disciplinary state based on direct surveillance, is still a dominant metaphor. However 
Poster claimed that digitisation requires a re-evaluation of this concept, because 
Foucault failed to notice that late C20th technological and infrastructural 
developments were qualitatively different from the earlier examples he studied: 
 
Today's circuits of communication and the databases they generate 
constitute a Superpanopticon, a system of surveillance without walls, 
windows, towers or guards. The quantitative advances in the 
technologies of surveillance result in a qualitative change in the 
microphysics of power. (Poster, 1990: 93). 
 
Oscar Gandy argued that information age capitalism operated through a panoptic sort 
– the processes by which people are categorised and valued on the basis of 
information contained in databases – claiming: 
 
it is only the locational constraints, the notion of separation by space, 
occasioned by the initial conceptualisation of the panoptic system as a 
building and by the surveillance as visual that limits Foucault's 
construct. But in an age of electronic networks, virtual memory, and 
remote access to distributed intelligence and data, disciplinary 
surveillance is no longer limited to single buildings, and observations 
no longer limited to line of sight. (Gandy, 1993: 23). 
                                                           
1 Panopticism derives from Jeremy Bentham’s reformatory design, the Panopticon,  in which prisoners  
never know whether or not they were being watched, and would therefore modify their behaviour as if 
the surveillance was constant. 
  
  
 
Digital sorting results in the creation of subjects through databases which do not 
replicate or imitate the original subject but create a multiplicity of selves which may 
be acted upon without the knowledge of the original. These ‘dividuals’ (Deleuze, 
1992), or data subjects, are increasingly more important for social identity than bodily 
selves (van der Ploeg, 1999, 2002; Lyon, 2001).  
 
The obvious differences between digital surveillance and analogue surveillance are 
quantitative: computer hard drives can store far more information, more conveniently 
and faster than analogue systems. However the fundamental differences lie in what 
can be done with the information gathered. There are two basic processes.  
 
Norris and Armstrong (1999), in their study of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in 
Britain, argue that what is of most concern is the linking of cameras to databases and 
the integration of different databases. Digitisation facilitates interconnection within 
and between surveillance points and systems.  To be truly effective, linkage is often 
required, so that captured and stored data can be compared. Technological reasons 
will always be found to integrate, however political and economic arguments are not 
always either presented, heard, or assigned equivalent importance, and thus a covert 
process of ‘surveillance creep’ (Marx, 1988: 2) occurs, where integration is presented 
as necessary or inevitable.  
 
Importantly, digital systems also allow the application of automated processes, 
algorithmic surveillance. An algorithm is a mathematical term for a set of 
instructions2; algorithms are the foundation of mathematics and computing. However 
algorithms need to be translated into a form that computers have been programmed to 
understand, software – essentially many coded algorithms linked together. 
Algorithmic surveillance refers to surveillance systems using software to extend raw 
data: from classification (sensor + database 1); through comparison (sensor + 
database 1 + software + database 2); to prediction, or even reaction (sensor + database 
1 + software + database 2 + alarm / weapon). 
 
Many of the latest surveillance technologies have embedded digital and algorithmic 
features. A city centre CCTV system, providing images that are watched and analysed 
by human operators, may be digitally recorded and stored but is not algorithmic. If the 
                                                           
2 The word algorithm derives from the 9th Century Muslim mathematician, Muhammed ibn Mūsā al-
Khwārizmī. 12th Century Christian scholars used al-Khwārizmī’s name, latinized as Algorismus, to 
differentiate his method of calculation from commonly used methods like the abacus or counting 
tables. For more on the history of algorithms, see Chabert et al. (1999). 
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system includes software that compares the faces of people observed with those in a 
database of suspects, it becomes algorithmic. Patient records in a Health Service 
computer are digital, and algorithmic to the extent that software determines the format 
of the information entered. However, the process becomes algorithmic surveillance 
when, for example, software compares patient records against signs of particular 
disease risk factors and categorises patients automatically.  
 
Some have claimed that algorithmic systems improve on conventional systems. Gary 
Marx argued that algorithmic surveillance has the potential to eliminate the potential 
for corruption and discrimination (Marx, 1995: 238). For example, a racist police 
officer cannot decide to arrest any black male when a facial recognition system can 
decide categorically whether a particular individual is the wanted man. However 
algorithmic surveillance can also intensify problems of conventional surveillance and 
of computerization. Already in social policy processes, “the perceived objectivity of 
computers is used to validate statistics which support partisan views” (Henman, 1997: 
335). However algorithmic systems also pose new questions, particularly relating to 
the removal of human discretion. In the most extreme cases, for example the 
development of movement recognition linked to automatic lethal response in certain 
commercially available perimeter defence systems (see: Wright, 1998; Doucet and 
Lloyd, 2001), this can lead to death without explanation or appeal. However, even in 
less immediately vital situations – for example one person’s Internet traffic secretly 
bypassing another's because of algorithmic prioritisation – the consequences can, 
nevertheless, be serious and exclusionary.  
 
It is critical to stress here the subtle and stealthy quality of the on-going social 
prioritisations and judgements that digital surveillance systems make possible. This 
means that critical social policy research must work to expose the ways in which 
these systems are being used to prioritise certain peoples’ mobilities, service quality 
and life chances, whilst simultaneously reducing those of those of less-favoured 
groups. Importantly, however, both beneficiaries and losers may, in practice, be 
utterly unaware digital prioritisation has actually gone on. This gives many of these 
crucial processes a curiously invisible and opaque quality that is a major challenge to 
researchers and policy makers alike. 
 
Digital Surveillance and the Changing Political 
Economies of the City 
 
  
  
As Thrift and French (2002) have shown, there are now so many software based 
surveillance and IT systems embedded into the infrastructure of cities that even the 
UK Audit Commission had enormous difficulties just finding them all when trying to 
ensure that they would all function after Y2K. They were often unable to discover 
who was responsible for them and how they could be checked and reprogrammed. 
Thrift and French (2002) claim that the ubiquity of such systems in the modern city is 
leading to the automatic production of space.  
 
This opacity and ubiquity means that it is hard to identify how the shift to automated, 
digital and algorithmic surveillance practices relates to current radical shifts in the 
political economies of welfare states, governance, punishment and urban space. 
Richard Jones (2001), following Deleuze (1992), argues that, as at-a-distance 
monitoring systems become intelligent and immanent within the city, so notions of 
traditional disciplinary control are replaced by the continuous electronic disciplining 
of subjects against redefined norms across time and space (see Graham, 1997).  
 
Social, commercial, and state based definitions of norms of behaviour, within the 
various contexts of the city, are thus increasingly automatically policed by 
assemblages of digital technology and software. These are less and less mediated by 
human discretion (Lianos and Douglas, 2000). Normative notions of good behaviour 
and transgression within the complex space-time fabrics of cities are embedded into 
software code. So, increasingly, are stipulations and punishments (e.g.:  electronic 
tagging).  
 
Increasingly, the encoding of software to automatically stipulate eligibility of access, 
entitlement of service, or punishment, is often done far away in time and space from 
the point of application (see Lessig, 1999). Software is coded across the world; call 
centres which monitor the gaze of automated cameras of electronic tags are switched 
to low-cost labour locations. Digital surveillance therefore promotes a new round of 
time-space distanciation, which moves us ever further from modern notions of 
discipline based on the gaze of supervisors within the same time-space as the 
disciplined subject (McCahill, 2002). Efforts are then made to enforce such norms 
and boundaries on the ground on a continuing, real-time basis, through the withdrawal 
of electronic or physical access privileges, the detailed stipulation and monitoring of 
acceptable behaviours, and the automated tracking of individual's time-space paths.  
 
Within contemporary political economic contexts marked by privatisation and 
consumerisation, this proliferation of automatic systems raises clear concerns that 
  
10 
social exclusion itself will be automated. Rather than being based exclusively on 
uneven access to the Internet, the digital divide in contemporary societies is based on 
the broader disconnections of certain groups from IT hardware and the growing use of 
automated surveillance and information systems to digitally red-line their life chances 
within automated regimes of service provision (Jupp, 2001).  Such systems actively 
facilitate mobility, access, services and life chances to those judged electronically to 
have the correct credentials and exclude, or relationally push away others (Norris, 
2002). They thereby accelerate the trend away from persons towards data subjects. As 
Norris et al. (1998) suggest, the problem with automated systems is that “they aim to 
facilitate exclusionary rather than inclusionary goals” (271). Algorithmic systems thus 
have a strong potential to fix identities as deviant and criminal – what Norris calls the 
technological mediation of suspicion (Norris, 2002). Lianos and Douglas note that 
this also means that challenging these identifications becomes harder, because 
Automated Socio-Technical Environments (or (ASTEs) “radically transform the 
cultural register of the societies in which they operate by introducing non-negotiable 
contexts of interaction”. (Lianos and Douglas 2000: 265).  
 
Digital surveillance techniques therefore make possible the widening 
commodification of urban space and the erection within cities of myriad exclusionary 
boundaries and access controls. These range from the electronic tagging of offenders 
within their defined time-space domains, to gated communities with pin number entry 
systems, and shopping malls with intense video surveillance (Davis, 1990, Flusty, 
1997). Digital surveillance systems also provide essential supports to the 
electronically priced commodification of road spaces; to digitally mediated 
consumption systems; and to smart card based public services, all of which allow 
users behaviours to be closely scrutinised. Crucially, then, the new digital surveillance 
assemblage is being shaped in a biased way to neatly dovetail with, and support, a 
new political economy of consumer citizenship and individualised mobility and 
consumption, which would otherwise not be possible (Garland, 2001).  
 
This is especially important within a context marked by the increasing privatisation of 
public services, infrastructures and domains (with a growing emphasis on treating 
users differently based on assessments of their direct profitability). Digital 
surveillance also provides a new range of management techniques to address a 
widening fear of crime and the entrenchment of entrepreneurial efforts to make 
(certain parts of) towns and city spaces more competitive in attracting investors and 
(selected) consumers. 
 
  
  
Digital Surveillance and the City: Three Examples 
 
After this broad examination of the connections between digital surveillance 
techniques and the changing political economies of cities, we are in a position to 
examine the links between digital surveillance, exclusion and urban space in more 
detail. We do this through three examples: algorithmic CCTV; information, 
communication and mobility spaces; and genetic surveillance. 
 
Algorithmic CCTV   
 
Many systems of sorting and analysis can be linked to video surveillance: two 
examples are facial recognition and movement recognition. These are both biometric 
technologies, basing their categorisation upon human bodily characteristics or traces 
(van der Ploeg, 1999, 2002).   
 
In the UK, facial recognition software is being piloted in three metropolitan areas: 
Newham in London; Birmingham; and Manchester (Meek, 2002). This technology is 
designed to compare the faces of individuals on the street with those of known 
offenders in databases. In both cases, the system used is FaceIt ARGUS, one of the 
most widespread of all facial recognition systems, produced by US-based Identix 
Corporation (formerly Visionics).  
 
FaceIt generates a ‘faceprint’, supposedly unique to each individual3. It uses a series 
of different algorithms. First, relatively simple pattern matching to detect whether a 
face like object is present and then whether the object is actually a face. Further 
algorithms create a normalised face, stripped of place and time-specific light and 
shade etc. More complex algorithmic processes known as Local Feature Analysis are 
then used to create the 84-bit faceprint, a set of codes that can be stored in a database 
or matched against existing stored codes.  
 
Identix say that FaceIt maps the intrinsic shape and features of the face, and that the 
faceprint contains enough information to accurately distinguish an individual amongst 
millions of people4. This can then be used in many ways, from simple verification - 
checking that an individual is who they say they are - to real-time surveillance. 
According to previous Visionics publicity: “FaceIt® can find human faces anywhere 
                                                           
3 What is FaceIt? 2001 Visionics website. <http://www.visionics.com/faceit/whatis.html> Accessed 
21/11/2002. Site no longer accessible. 
4 FaceIt Face Recognition Software. 2002 Identix Website. 
<http://www.identix.com/products/pro_faceit.html> Accessed 01/11/2002. 
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in the field of view and at any distance, and it can continuously track them and crop 
them out of the scene, matching the face against a watch list”5. 
 
Another developing area is movement recognition. Systems in use to detect motion 
and movement tend to be relatively simple, based on blobs of particular colours that 
remain constant in sampled frames of a CCTV image, such as the EU funded 
Cromatica project at King’s College, London6. This was designed for crowd flow 
management, but when piloted on the London Underground, attracted attention for its 
potential to help reduce the numbers of suicides, as it had been observed that the 
suicidal “tend to wait for at least ten minutes on the platform, missing trains, before 
taking their last few tragic steps” (Graham-Rowe, 1999: 23, quoted in Norris, 2002).  
In Orlando, Florida, another experimental system in a high crime neighbourhood 
claims to “detect… fires, or unusual body movements” (Economist 2000: 16). 
 
Gait recognition has also attracted significant media attention. Headlines like “The 
way you walk pins down who you are”7 implied a reversion to Victorian notions of 
visible criminal character. The reality is more prosaic if still technically impressive. 
Researchers at the University of Southampton have been developing algorithms for 
the individual human gait. These, like faceprints, have the potential to be stored as 
information to be compared to existing images.  It is perhaps even more complex than 
facial recognition, but according to as group leader Mark Nixon, “a distant silhouette 
will provide enough data to make a positive recognition once we get the system 
working properly” (McKie, 1999). However, despite the publicity, the systems being 
developed have not progressed to the point of commercial use at this stage. 
 
Certainty about identity is crucial to the argument for algorithmic CCTV: as was 
argued earlier, one of the main reasons for its increasing popularity was to counter 
arguments about human fallibility. But there are allegations that the technologies, and 
FaceIt in particular, simply do not work. Research by Norris and others (cited in 
Rosen, 2001), and by The Guardian newspaper (Meek, 2002) shows that not a single 
arrest has been made as a result of the use of FaceIt in Newham, and that the 
authorities overstated both the technological capability of the system and the size of 
their database of suspects. Until recently, it was relatively unusual for FaceIt to be 
                                                           
5 Verification. 2001 Visionics website. <http://www.visionics.com/faceit/tech/verif.html> Accessed 
21/11/2002. Site no longer accessible. 
6 Cromatica Project website. 1999. <http://www.research.eee.kcl.ac.uk/vrl/#cromatica>  Accessed 
21/11/2001 
7 Press Reports on Gait Recognition at Southampton. 2001. ISIS website. 
<http://www.isis.ecs.soton.ac.uk/image/gait/press/> Accessed 01/11/2002.  
  
  
used in live CCTV systems monitoring people moving freely in urban environments, 
by far its most common usages remain where movement is spatially restricted and a 
throughput of well-lit, similarly angled faces is guaranteed  (entry systems; airport 
check-in areas etc.)8. However even in controlled conditions, failure rates of 53% 
have been identified at Palm Beach International Airport (Scheers, 2002). 
Justification for facial recognition has to fall back on arguments about deterrence, 
dominant in UK policy discourses promoting CCTV (Norris and Armstrong, 1999). 
However such technical arguments should not detract from fundamental questions 
about categorisation and bypass. As described earlier, there are significant concerns 
about the way in which such systems rely on and reinforce the categorisation of 
certain socio-spatial risk categories: high crime neighbourhoods, known criminals or 
dangerous socio-economic groups (Lianos and Douglas, 2000).  
 
Information, Communication and Mobility Services in the City 
 
Our second range of examples involves the use of new information and 
communications technologies (ICTs), and digital surveillance, to subtly differentiate 
consumers within transport, communications, or service provision. Here, algorithms 
are being used at the interface of databases and telecommunications networks to 
allocate different levels of service to different users on an increasingly automated 
basis. This is done to overcome problems of congestion, queuing and service quality 
and maximise the quality of service for the most profitable users. Examples include 
Internet prioritisation, electronic road pricing, call centre call queuing, and the use of 
biometrics to bypass international passport and immigration controls (see Graham and 
Marvin, 2001).  
 
When the Internet first became a mass medium in the late 1990s it was impossible to 
give one user a priority service over another. All packets of data on the Internet were 
queued when there was congestion. However on the commercialised Internet, 
dominated by transnational media conglomerates, new software protocols are being 
embedded into the routers that switch Internet traffic. These smart routers 
automatically and actively discriminate between different users’ packets, especially in 
times of congestion.  They can sift priority packets, allowing them passage, whilst 
automatically blocking those from non-premium users (Schiller, 1999).  
 
Thus, high quality Internet and e-commerce services can now be guaranteed to 
premium users irrespective of wider conditions, whilst non-premium users 
                                                           
8 This is changing, particularly since 9/11 (see Rosen, 2001) 
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simultaneously experience ‘website not available’ signals. This further supports the 
unbundling of Internet and e-commerce services, as different qualities can be 
packaged and sold at different rates to different markets (Graham and Marvin, 2001). 
As Emily Tseng suggests, "the ability to discriminate and prioritize data traffic is now 
being built into the [Internet] system. Therefore economics can shape the way packets 
flow through the networks and therefore whose content is more important" (2000: 
12).  
 
The integration of customer databases within call centres provides another example of 
digital discrimination. Initially, call centres operated through the judgement and 
discretion of call centre operators. One system installed at South West Water in the 
UK in the mid 1990s, for example, meant that: 
 
"when a customer rings, just the giving of  their name and postcode to 
the member of staff [a practise often now automated through call-line 
identification], allows all account details, including records of past 
telephone calls,  billing dates and payments, even scanned images of 
letters, to be displayed. This amount of information enables staff to deal 
with different customers in different ways. A customer who repeatedly 
defaults with payment will be treated completely differently from one 
who has only defaulted once" (Utility Week, 1995) 
 
Now that call centres are equipped with Call Line Identification (CLI) - allowing 
operators to detect the phone numbers of incoming calls - such practices are being 
automated. Automated surveillance system are emerging which can differentially 
queue calls according to algorithmic judgements of the profits the company makes 
from them. Good customers are thus answered quickly whilst bad ones are put on 
hold. As with Internet prioritisation, neither user is likely to know that such 
prioritisation and distancing is occurring. 
 
New algorithmic techniques are also being used to reduce road congestion, whilst 
improving the mobilities of privileged drivers. With road space increasingly 
congested, electronic road pricing is an ever more popular political choice. A range of 
governments have brought in private or public private regimes to either electronically 
price entry into existing city centres (Singapore and, from February 2003, London), or 
build new private premium highways that are only accessible to drivers with in-car 
electronic transponders (including Toronto, LA, San Diego, Melbourne and Manila).  
 
  
  
In both cases, road space becomes a priced commodity dependent on users having 
appropriate onboard technology, and the resources - and often bank accounts - to pay 
bills. In some cases, systems allow traffic flow to be guaranteed whatever the level of 
external traffic congestion. On the San Diego I-15 highway, for example, software 
monitoring congestion levels on the premium, priced, highway can signal real-time 
price increases when congestion causes flow to decrease. Communicated to drivers, 
this reduces demand and reinstates free flowing conditions.  
 
Whilst such systems have environmental benefits, it can also be argued that their 
implementation is closely related to the changing political economy of cities. This is 
because, like Internet prioritisation and call-centre queuing, they facilitate the removal 
of what might be called cash-poor / time-rich users from the congested mobility 
network, in the process facilitating premium network conditions for cash-rich / time-
poor users (Graham and Marvin, 2001). The Government of Hong Kong, for example, 
recently discussed implementing a city centre road pricing system like that in 
Singapore. This was not to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, it was a direct 
response to the lobbying of corporate CEOs who were sick of having to walk the last 
half mile to meetings in hot, humid conditions because of gridlock. These executives 
had grown used to seamless door-to-door service uninhibited by traffic in Singapore’s 
priced CBD. 
 
Finally, algorithmic surveillance now allows highly mobile, affluent business 
travellers to directly bypass normal immigration and ticketing at major international 
airports. This allows them to move seamlessly and speedily through the architectural 
and technological systems designed to separate air-side and ground-sides within 
major international airports (Virilio, 1991: 10). For example, hand-scans for the most 
frequent business travellers are now in operation in major airports linking the US, the 
Netherlands, Canada and Germany and other OECD nations under the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS). 
Selected premium travellers are issued with a smart card that records their hand 
geometry: "Each time the traveller passes through customs, they present the card and 
place their hand in a reader that verifies their identity and links into international 
databases", allowing them instant progress (Banisar, 1999).  By 1999, the scheme had 
70,000 participants and the INS was planning to extend the system globally. Such 
systems extend the infrastructure of highly luxurious airport lounges and facilities 
only accessible to identified elite passengers9. ICT surveillance assemblages privilege 
                                                           
9 As with facial recognition, such schemes are proliferating in the wake of 9/11, despite having no 
direct connection with the prevention of terrorism.  
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some users whilst those deemed to warrant less (or no) mobility (especially illegal 
immigrants and refugees) face ever-increasing efforts to make international 
boundaries less permeable through new border control systems. 
 
Genetics and Medical Surveillance 
 
Medicine, particularly public health and epidemiology, have a long history of 
surveillant practices, largely in the notification and monitoring of outbreaks of 
infectious disease (Foucault, 1973, 1975; Declich and Carter, 1994; Mooney, 1999). 
However, digitisation is transforming these practises. Two linked cases will be 
mentioned here: the first is that of the Electronic Patient Record (EPR), and the 
second, research into genetics.  
 
As van der Ploeg (2002) writes:  
 
Health care systems throughout the Western countries are moving 
towards on-line accessible EPRs into which all data on medical history, 
medication, test results from a broad variety of diagnostic (often already 
computer based) techniques, and therapies belonging to a particular 
individuals medical biography are accumulated, and can be accessed by 
relevant care givers. 
 
EPRs are convenient and contribute to quick and accurate diagnosis of illness and 
therefore the patient welfare and public health. However they also gradually 
accumulate a mass of personal information, most of which has no direct relevance to 
any particular medical condition. Such records are protected through law and medical 
ethics, but, as Mooney (1999) has shown in his analysis of debates about public health 
and privacy in the C18th and C19th, personal rights can lose out to what is considered 
to be the public good, a slippery and amorphous notion. For CCTV, the media outrage 
around the Jamie Bulger murder case led to a massive expansion of video surveillance 
without much public debate (Norris and Armstrong, 1999), and one can easily 
imagine outside issues like international terrorism or preventative genetics forcing a 
reconsideration of civil rights versus the public good. The pressure to integrate for 
example, medical and police databases for law enforcement purposes will become 
more and more intense as forensic science improves, and given the increasing 
popularity of biocriminology, and the pressure for pre-emptive law enforcement 
policies, such as DNA screening (Rose, 2000).  
 
  
  
But it is not 1984-style fears of state surveillance that give most cause for concern; it 
is the increasing influence of the private sector in health care provision. The 
relationship between public database-holders and the private sector is a key issue, and 
is again complicated by digitisation. Modern medical research, and in particular 
genetics, depends increasingly on high-powered computing. As Moor remarks, “it is 
[…] only through the eyes of computers that we can hope to map and sequence the 
human genome in a practical period of time” (Moor, 2000: 257) 
 
Genetic records are also so readily digitisable that Nelkin and Andrews (1999) can 
give several examples of scientists predicting that smartcards with an encoded 
personal genome will soon replace current methods of personal identification. 
Progress towards the convergence of EPRs, personal genome records, and private 
financial interests, are already well under way. For example, leaked minutes of a 
high-level advisory group working towards a new Health Green Paper by the UK 
Labour government showed that the group proposes making results of DNA sampling 
in NHS hospitals available to pharmaceutical companies (Barnett and Hinsliff, 2001). 
The state of Iceland has licensed its entire national medical database to American 
genetics company, deCODE, for research and commercial purposes (Rose, 2001), and 
Estonia is also planning a genetic database of its citizens (Pollack, 2000).  
 
Once state EPRs are commodified, so prospects for democratic control over personal 
information decrease, and the discriminatory potential multiplies. The insurance 
industry is just one domain that is being transformed by this increasing 
commodification (Pokorski, 1997; Cook, 1999). Insurance has serious implications 
for personal well-being when individuals are increasingly forced to find private 
healthcare and retirement solutions and rely less upon decreasing state provision. 
Those whose genetic records make them too financially risky for insurance companies 
could find themselves bypassed by neoliberal health policies. Moreover, mutualised 
life and health insurance systems, built up over centuries based on the social pooling 
of aggregate risks, threaten to be unbundled and individualised in the same ways that 
the physical infrastructures of cities. Users defined through their genetic profiles as 
low risk / high profit could secede from generalised rates and gain low cost cover, 
whereas those with high risks of long term, costly illness or early death, could be 
excluded from cover (Graham and Marvin, 2001). 
 
Conclusions:  
Research, Policy and Resistance 
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As digital surveillance proliferates, the politics of surveillance are increasingly the 
politics of code. The processes through which algorithms and software are 
constructed are often now the only parts of the disciplinary chain completely open to 
human discretion and shaping. Once switched on, many digital systems become 
supervised agents which continually help to determine on-going social outcomes in 
space and time (Lianos and Douglas, 2000).  
 
The research challenges raised here are clear. Software for surveillance is often 
bought off the shelf from transnational suppliers. Critical researchers into digital 
algorithmic systems practices face an imperative to get inside the production and 
implementation of code (Thrift and French, 2002). This might mean switching the 
focus of research to the social and political assumptions that software producers 
embedded (unconsciously or consciously) into their algorithms years before (and 
thousands of miles away) from the site of application. Research is required which 
systematically tracks the sourcing, implementation and implications of digital 
surveillance in practice, across multiple spaces, as the code moves from inception to 
application. Such research also needs to address time, as another implication of digital 
surveillance is decrease the ability of people to escape deemed offences in the distant 
past (Blanchette and Johnson, 2002). 
 
The policy implications of such research are likely are complex and problematic. 
Digital surveillance systems tend to be developed, designed and deployed in ways that 
hide the social judgements that such systems perpetuate. Rates of technological 
innovation are rapid. And policy-makers face serious problems in simply 
understanding the esoteric and technical worlds of the new surveillance. Policy-
makers also face geographical and jurisdictional problems. Efforts to regulate and 
control digital surveillance are necessarily bound by the geographical jurisdictions 
which give them political legitimacy and power. But social assumptions embedded in 
surveillance software in one context can have major ramifications in distant times and 
places. The practices of digitally sorting and sifting societies occur through globally 
stretched sociotechnical relations (Lyon, 2001).  
 
 Another major problem concerns the dominant policy approach to surveillance: the 
concept of privacy. Privacy is fundamentally embedded both in the Lockean notion of 
property and in the patriarchal dynamics of the household (Lyon 1994). Its current 
politics are also dominated by the discourses of individualist libertarian ‘cyber-
liberties’, which renders it inadequate to dealing with complex socio-geographical 
polarization.  
  
  
 
We believe that a strong regulatory approach, based on the principle of the mutual 
transparency of state and individual (see Brin, 1999), could simultaneously work at 
the many geographical scales at which social and economic regulation occurs. 
However, two current trajectories make this transparent society less than likely.  The 
first is the post-9/11 climate. Currently, many Western  policy-makers would consider 
such transparency politically unacceptable, particularly as pressures increase from the 
right for decreasing civil liberties in the name of security (see Huber and Mills 2002).  
 
The second is that the new digital surveillance systems are being used to support the 
dominant neoliberal economic agenda – for example the generalised privatisation 
envisaged by the proposed General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) – 
because they can allow ‘unbundling’ of previously public infrastructures and spaces 
and support pay-per-use and sophisticated consumer monitoring. As public, welfare 
and social service regimes restructure and are privatised, or are being remodelled 
through various forms of ‘partnership’, the automated control and sifting capabilities 
of digital surveillance techniques are increasingly being utilised to support 
differentiated service regimes. These practices closely modelled on those in the 
private sector ; in many cases, private sector firms are colonising public and welfare 
service regimes with precisely such practices.. 
 
Does this mean that the choice is for critical response to digital surveillance to be 
bound with either cyber-liberties, resistance to the ‘war on terrorism’ or with anti-
globalization struggles? Not necessarily – although placing the spread of digital 
surveillance with a wider political-economic critique is crucial. People do “refuse to 
disappear beneath the imperatives of spatial regulation that favors select target 
markets” (Flusty, 2000: 156). Resistance exists in many forms, from the playful 
guerrilla art of the Surveillance Camera Players10, the systematic anti-panopticism of 
the i-SEE project in New York, calculating ‘paths of least surveillance’ (Schenke and 
the IAA, 2002)11, to the everyday practices of the targeted. In British towns, young 
black men have been shown to develop elaborate practices to exploit CCTV system 
‘blindspots’ (Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Toon, 2000). Similarly, Steven Flusty has 
shown how the excluded in LA work to exploit the gaps: one busker, for example, 
says he “knows where to find every security camera on Bunker Hill” (Flusty, 2000: 
152).  
 
                                                           
10 Surveillance Camera Players Website. 2002. <http://www.notbored.org/the-scp.html> Accessed 
01/11/2002 
11 i-SEE website. http://www.appliedautonomy.com/isee/ 
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Resistance varies across policy domains. In health, outside professional disquiet, it 
has been minimal. Whilst the Icelandic state at least provided mechanisms for public 
consultation on the role of deCODE (Rose, 2001), the UK government has shown no 
such inclination. The practices of insurance companies and health providers are 
similarly opaque, and, unlike the case of CCTV, there seems little space for individual 
acts of subversion.  
 
Finally we must stress that digital surveillance systems do have real limits. Whilst the 
technologies are increasing their capabilities quickly, often they are still not nearly as 
reliable as their proponents claim. For example, facial recognition is still prone to 
misidentification, although the nature of these errors is in itself a matter of concern. In 
addition, the sheer diversity of identities, social worlds and political pressures in 
contemporary cities can quickly swamp crude efforts to impose simplistic notions of 
exclusion and purified urban order.  Contemporary cities remain as sites of jumbled, 
superimposed and contested orderings and meanings ; they are “points of 
interconnection, not hermetically sealed objects” (Thrift, 1997: 143). Multiple ‘spill-
overs’ can easily saturate and overwhelm simple attempts at establishing and 
maintaining ‘hard’ disciplinary boundaries. Virtually all boundaries remain to some 
extent porous, and perfect control strategies are never possible.   
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